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TIGHT MONEY AND POSSIBLE SUBSTANTIVE DEFENSES
TO ENFORCEMENT OF FUTURE MORTGAGE COMMITMENTS
Daniel C. Draper*
I. Introduction
No western economy has solved the problem of full employment and stable
prices. Despite the efforts of central bankers and economic planners, the economy has oscillated between inflation and unemployment and today is plagued
by both.
Although the mechanics of achieving optimum employment with
minimum impact on price levels have taken many forms, they have all emphasized
credit restrictions during times of inflation. These restrictions have manifested
themselves in increasingly wide fluctuations in interest rates as government
demands have preempted credit previously available to the private sector and
the intermediaries which serve it. The current money crisis, the fourth in nine
years, particularly affects the construction industry-dependent as it is on longterm credit. The economy has been plagued by tight money crises in 1966,
1969, and again in the fall of 1973. The current crisis, however, portends a
more severe2 shortage of mortgage credit than ever.
Against this setting, some imaginative mortgage bankers and lending institutions lacking current funds have issued future commitments at fixed rates
to purchase or make mortgages.' By agreeing to furnish dollars tomorrow at
today's prices,' long-term lenders have to some extent cushioned the impact of
stop-start mortgage credit and have thereby produced more orderly money
markets. Additionally, a sponsor-builder with a long-term mortgage loan commitment can use it to secure construction financing5 at presumably lower costs
in the continuing inflationary spiral, provided that prospective rental income
can sustain the currently high interim and long-term interest rates. The builder
or promoter, moreover, knows before he starts construction that his price for
* Member of the New York Bar; Chairman, Banking Committee of the New York
County Lawyers? Association; member of the Committee on Real Property of the Association
of the Bar of the City of New York. B.A. 1940, M.A. 1941, West Virginia University; L.L.B.1947, Harvard University. I am indebted to Mr. Samuel Goldman for his invaluable assistance
in the preparation of this article.
1 Quarterly Economic Report, 32 THE MORTGAGE BANKER 24B (1972); see 58 FED.
RE.SRV, BULL. A-9-10, A-34-35, A-53 (1974) (detailed summary of recent fluctuations in
lending rates).
2 Jones, Persistent Inflation Calls for New Economic Game Plan, 34 THE MORTGAGE
BANKER

10 (1974); New York Times, August 31, 1974, at 19, col. 6, citing Professor Hyman

Minsky, Professor of Economics at Washington University.
3 Sometimes the lender will protect itself against the possibility that it will not have
funds immediately available at the closing date by including a provision permitting delay at
the lender's option. For example: "The loan shall be closed not later than
You agree to give us 30 days' prior written notice of the closing and upon receipt of such
notice we may, by notice to you in writing, delay such closing for a period of not more than
six months."
4 Jacobs & Kozuch, Is There a Future for a Mortgage Futures Market?, 34 THE MORTGAGE BANKER 5 (1974).
5 Particularly in this market, construction lenders require long-term "takeouts' which
assure that the construction loan will be paid (refinanced) on maturity.
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long-term money is fixed. Likewise, the lender can reduce its vulnerability to
downside interest rate fluctuations by entering into future commitments to lend
anticipated incoming funds from mortgage principal payments. Future trading in
commodities has produced similar beneficial results by permitting hedging against
prospective price changes;6 the future commitment in effect treats money as a
commodity.1 A sponsor-builder can hedge its position against a further rise in the
price of money by transferring the risk, often for a fee s to the long-term lender
who is better able to bear it. The long-term lender, on the other hand, can assure
itself of a future loan inventory at a point in the business cycle when a previous
tight money period has reduced construction by restricting the availability of
mortgages. The long-term lender can assume this risk because it has a steady
cash flow from amortization payments on its mortgage portfolio.9
Through this mechanism, the construction industry can better compete for
the limited available credit when the central banking authorities constrict credit
to reduce total consumption. To the extent the device is effective, it reduces the
inefficiencies created by the cyclical nature of the construction industry. 10
The enforceability of mortgage and loan commitments, therefore, serves
6 Kroll, Commodity Hedging for Insurance and Profit, C.P.A.J., April, 1972, at 303;
Yamey, Short Hedging and Long Hedging in Futures Markets: Symmetry and Asymmetry,
14 J. LAW & ECON. 413 (1971); H. Goss, THE THEORY OF FUTURE TRADING (1972).
7 "But the defendant was not building a shopping center; it was providing money as a
commodity." [Emphasis supplied.] Boston Rd. Shopping Center, Inc. v. Teachers Ins. Annuity Ass'n of America, 13 App. Div. 2d 106, 109, 213 N.Y.S.2d 522, 526 (1961), aff'd, 11
N.Y.2d 831, 182 N.E.2d 116, 227 N.Y.S.2d 443 (1962).
8 In theory, such commitment fees should not constitute interest for usury purposes because they represent payments for the lender's assumption of the risk that rates will be higher
at the time the loan closes than the so-called "spot?' rate in effect at the time the commitment
issues. Cf. Chambers & Co. v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 224 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1955).
Goldman v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 251 Md. 575, 248 A.2d 154 (1968); Continental
Assurance Co. v. Van Cleve Bldg. & Constr. Co., 260 S.W.2d 319 (Mo. Ct. App. 1953). But
the New York State Banking Department, after first adopting this rationale, now has issued
novel regulations that in effect have rejected it for one- and two-family-dwelling mortgages.
See Draper, Highlights of Usury for the Thrift Industry in BUSINESS AND LEGAL PROBLEMS
OF THE THRIFT INDUSTRY 122 (2d ed. 1970); Sintenis, Current Treatment of Non-Refundable

Commitment Fee and Related Problems, 86 BANKING L.J. 590 (1969).
9
The usual technique is to meet commitment requirements out of cash-flow from
prior investments and maturing obligations. If necessary, short-term paper can be
sold or, if further necessary money can actually be borrowed by the lender at a prime
rate for a brief period until the lender has funds to repay the loan.
Wolf, The Refundable Commitment Fee, 23 Bus. LAWYER 1065, 1069 (1968). See also
note 3 supra.
10 Compared to the Gross National Product, the transactions affected by the future commitment device may well not have more than a minimal effect on the national price structure.
The limited number of projects that can sustain current high interest costs, and the unwillingness of lending institutions to take future positions not covered by amortization runoffs probably would assure that the device will not adversely affect central bank restrictive monetary
policies. With respect to residential construction, BUSINESS WEEx, Aug. 17, 1974, at 50
states:
Arnold Packer of the Committee for Economic Development (CED) has emphasized that housing is not a good sector to absorb the variability of the economy
because it accounts for only 4% of the total gross national product. Therefore,
even small fluctuations of the total will show up as massive ups and downs in housing.
Policies that even out and spread around the total variability are thus less disruptive
and more equitable, particularly in light of the CED's own 1973 policy statement
on housing, which calculated that as many as one out of seven households in the
U. S. has inadequate housing. Possible procedural or conceptual impediments to
remedies available to mortgage lenders are discussed in Draper, The Broken Commitment: A Modern View of the Mortgage Lender's Remedy, 59 CoRNELL L. Q. 418
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Broken Commitment].
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borrowers and lenders alike. At the same time, wide interest rate fluctuations
have caused borrowers (when rates fall) and lenders (when rates rise) to attack
the substantive validity of mortgage commitments where performance or nonperformance often involves hundreds of thousands of dollars even after discounting to present-day values."
Despite the fact that future commitments have long been used, almost all
litigation 2 involving them has occurred in the last twenty years'2 since the advent
of a money-managed economy. The attacks on this system have generally
centered on commitment provisions which require certain matters, such as leases
or the state of title, to be in form and/or in substance "satisfactory"'1 to the
lender, its counsel, or both.'
Lenders impose these "satisfaction clauses" principally because the sponsorbuilder usually cannot fulfill all the prerequisites which the lender requires before
making the commitment. For example, a shopping center developer normally
wants to be able to begin construction before he has procured all of the tenants,
although a diligent lender would make the loan only when assured that the leases
adequately provide for protection of its security. Of course, with respect to leases
involving major tenants, the careful developer often resolves potentially difficult
problems with the lender prior to signing the commitment, thus rendering a
satisfaction clause unnecessary. Frequently, however, this cannot be done.
Although the typical commitment indicates an intent by the parties to be
bound,' 6 critics of the commitment device nevertheless question whether satisfaction provisions limit the options of the lender and fill the gaps in order to make
the agreement binding. This article will consider and respond to the arguments
11 Broken Commitment, supra note 10, at 428.
12 Where, of course, the "so-called" commitment is not obligatory, at least in form, no
problems of enforcement or defense to enforcement would arise; see Sintenis, supra note 8,
at 597-603 (examples given of careless practice which render written commitments unenforceable through omission of mutual terms). See note 21 infra.
13 There is considerable case law of more ancient vintage with respect to "instant delivery" loan commitments. See, e.g., Jay v. Wilson, 91 Hun. 391, 36 N.Y.S. 186 (1895),
aff'd, 158 N.Y. 693, 53 N.E. 1126 (1899).
14 On the subject of "satisfaction!' clauses generally, see 3A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§
644-48 (rev. ed. 1963); 5 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 675A, 675B (3d ed. 1961) ; RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 265 (1932); 17 Am. JuR. 2D Contracts §§ 366-69 (1964); Annot.,
6 A.L.R. 1497 (1920) (employment contract conditional upon the services rendered being
satisfactory); Annot., 81 A.L.R. 1058 (1932) (option for renewal of lease conditional upon
the lease having been satisfactory to lessor); Annot., 167 A.L.R. 411 (1947) (contract for
sale of land which makes performance conditional upon purchaser's or third person's satisfaction with condition of property); Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d 1114 (1955) (private work must
be done to satisfaction of owner); Annot., 47 A.L.R.2d (1956) (contract for sale of land
provision that title must be satisfactory purchaser); Annot., 86 A.L.R.2d 200 (1962) (sale
of goods subject to satisfaction of buyer).
15 For an example of a loan commitment see Draper, Permanent Mortgage Financing
The Shopping Center in REAL ESTATe FINANCING 2D 117 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Shopping Center].
16 Melody, ProtectingLoan Commitments, 33 THE MORTGAGE BANKER 28 (1973):
There is probably no legal document so carelessly drafted as a loan commitment. A
study conducted by the Mortgage Bankers Association Income Property Finance
Subcommittee showed that many lender commitments are almost impossible-short
of litigation-to interpret concerning precisely what is supposed to happen if the
borrower defaults.
An example of an obligatory clause is "The Loan, which by your acceptance of this commitment you agree to accept from us Q, shall be in the amount of ...." Shopping Center, supra
note 15, at 119.
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that future commitments containing satisfaction clauses are illusory, vague and
indefinite, or violative of the Statute of Frauds.
II. Illusory Consideration
Professor Corbin defines an illusory promise as "words in promissory form
that promise nothing; they do not purport to put any limitation on the freedom
of the alleged promisor but leave his future action subject to his own future will,
just as would have happened had he said no words at all."'" If a contract imposes no definite obligation on one party to perform, it lacks mutuality of obligation and no enforceable obligation exists.'" One who promises to do a thing only
if it pleases him is not bound to perform. 9 Williston noted that it "is only where
the option reserved the promisor is unlimited that his promise becomes illusory,""
and Corbin concluded that a court should not frustrate the parties' intent to be
bound where it can fill in the gaps so as to limit choices. 2'
In Lawrence Block Co. v. Palston,2 the court examined a satisfaction clause
similar to those found in loan commitments and apparently determined that the
gaps could not be filled. There, a contract for the sale of land was made subject
to three conditions: (1) Buyer's obtaining sufficient financing secured by a deed
of trust, (2) buyer's approval of OPA Rent Statements, and (3) buyer's inspection and approval of all apartments. Immediately after the agreement was
signed, the purchaser tried but was unable to procure the required deed of trust
and the transaction was cancelled. Thereupon, the broker who had arranged
the transaction sued for his commission, maintaining that a valid contract of sale
had been made. At least with respect to the last two conditions, 23 the court held
that since the buyer's discretion to approve and be bound or disapprove and not
be bound was unrestricted, the contract was illusory:
No standard or basis for these "approvals" is established. No hint is
given as to what criteria, if any, are to determine whether the OPA rent
statements and all the apartments will be approved by the buyer. What are
the rent statements to contain or show for the offeror's approval to be forthcoming? What are the apartments to have and consist of in order to be
"approved"? Are they to satisfy him as to size, furnishings, decor? Who
1 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 145 (rev. ed. 1963).
18 Patty v. Berryman, 95 Cal. App. 2d 159, 212 P.2d 937 (1949).
19 Central Oil Co. v. Southern Ref. Co., 154 Cal. 165, 97 P. 177 (1908).
20 1 S. WILUSTON, CONTRACTS § 43 at 143 (3d ed. 1957).
21 1 A. CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 95 at 400 (rev. ed. 1963), cited with approval in Paley
v. Barton Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 82 N.J. Super. 75, 196 A.2d 682 (1964) and Sonnenblick-Goldman Corp. v. Murphy, 420 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir. 1970); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 265,
comment a (1932). In White Lakes Shopping Center, Inc. v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins.
Co., 208 Kan. 121, 490 P.2d 609 (1971), the Kansas Supreme Court held:
It is suggested that ... the rules for determination set forth herein should not apply
to loan commitment agreements. The rules set forth in [citation omitted] are applicable under the general law relating to contracts. We see no reason for applying
different rules to loan commitment agreements.
Id. at 127, 490 P.2d 614.
22 123 Cal. App. 2d 300, 266 P.2d 856 (1954).
23 Relating to the first condition, that purchaser secure an adequate deed of trust, the
court held that since this condition had been handwritten upon the contract of sale after the
vendor had signed it, it constituted a counteroffer. Since the seller did not subsequently
accept this counteroffer, no enforceable contract was formed.
17
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is to judge whether he is satisfied with the statements and apartments?
Only the buyer himself. It is entirely a subjective matter.24
The holding of Lawrence Block that the "subject to" provisions rendered
the contract illusory was specifically overruled only four years later in Mattei v.
25
Hopper.
In Mattei, a written agreement for the sale of land to be developed into a
shopping center contained the following familiar provision: "Subject to Coldwell
Banker & Company obtaining leases satisfactory to the purchaser."26 In order to
give the purchaser time to find satisfactory tenants, final consummation by payment and conveyance was not required until after a period of 120 days. Before
the end of that period, the seller repudiated. Thereafter, the purchaser informed
him that he had found satisfactory tenants, demanded conveyance, and sued for
damages for breach. The trial court found the purchaser's promise illusory and
held the contract unenforceable. The District Court of Appeal reversed the
decision. The California Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Court of
Appeals but nevertheless reversed the trial court. It held that the purchaser's
promise was not illusory, even though conditioned on finding satisfactory tenants.
The court stated that satisfaction clauses have been divided into two primary categories which have been accorded different treatment.27 First, where the contract
condition calls for satisfaction as to "commercial value or quality, operative
fitness, or mechanical utility," dissatisfaction cannot be arbitrary. The standard
of a "reasonable person" has been used to determine whether satisfaction has been
received and the gap filled. However, the Mattei court stated that the variables
involved in ascertaining whether a lease is satisfactory to the lessor are too numerous to permit application of the "reasonable man" standard:
Illustrative of some of the factors ... are the duration of the leases, their
provisions for renewal options, if any, their convenants and restrictions, the
amounts of the rentals, the financial
responsibility of the lessees, and the
28
character of the lessees' businesses.
This multiplicity of factors led the court to conclude that the evaluation of
leases more appropriately falls within the second category of satisfaction clausesthose involving fancy, taste, or judgment. "Where the question is one of judgment, the promisor's determination that he is not satisfied, when made in good
faith, has been held to be a defense to an action on the contract."2 9 The promised
duty to act in good faith" was sufficient consideration to support the contract,
24 123 Cal. App. 2d 309, 266 P.2d 861-62.
25 51 Cal. 2d 119, 330 P.2d 625 (1958).
26 Id. at 121, 330 P.2d 626.
27 Id. at 122-23, 330 P.2d 626-27. Fursmidt v. Hotel Abbey Holding Corp., 10 App.
Div. 2d 447, 200 N.Y.S.2d 256 (1960), also distinguishes between the two types of "satisfaction" clauses. See also 3 S. WILLISTON, CoNTRACrs § 675A at 1946 (rev. ed. 1936).
28 51 Cal. 2d 123, 330 P.2d 627.
29 Id.
30 In a related context, the New York Supreme Court, First Department, applied the
"good faith test' even though one of the parties was given "absolute discretion" to cancel
the contract by its terms. The contract involved was an underwriting agreement and the
underwriter was given the privilege of terminating the agreement if in its "absolute discretion"
it determined that market conditions and prospects for the public offering were such as to
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notwithstanding the argument that the promises involved were illusory and
lacked mutuality of obligation."
Mattei was followed by another case interpreting a similar satisfaction clause.
In Lyon v. Giannoni,3 the court, citing Mattei, held that a clause in a contract
for the sale of realty conditioning the purchaser's obligations upon "satisfactory
tests for water available" on the property did not render the contract illusory.3
The court however, still citing Mattei, went on to impose the "reasonable man"
standard, stating that the determination of whether satisfactory water was available fell within the category of "commercial value or quality, operative fitness, or
mechanical utility." The court did not even consider the possibility that the good
faith standard might have been more appropriate. Rather, it cited a series of
California cases applying the reasonable man test, 4 without even mentioning
the good faith standard which was the basis of the Mattei decision. Did this
represent a departure from Mattei, or is the holding merely that what constitutes
satisfactory water is more readily ascertainable than what constitutes satisfactory
leases?"5
Mattei and subsequent cases, although rejecting the argument that a satisfaction clause renders a contract illusory, still leave many unanswered questions.
As to loan commitments, is it sufficient that the lender be genuinely dissatisfied
or must he additionally decide whether his decision is reasonable? If the test is
subjective, what are the criteria for determining "good faith"? If it is objective,
what are the operable variables? More critically, if the test varies from issue to
issue, how do you determine which standard applies?
A subsequent New York case involving loan commitments perhaps puts
these issues in some perspective. In Boston Road Shopping Center, Inc. v.
Teachers Insurance & Annuity Association of America, 6 the defendant promised
to lend and the plaintiff promised to borrow $1,100,000 on stated terms to
finance a shopping center. The plaintiff made a "stand-by deposit" of $22,000
which was to be returned on full performance by plaintiff or retained by defendant as liquidated damages in case of breach. The original commitment
provided that the plaintiff would "deliver for the examination of defendant's
counsel" the original leases described in the attached Schedule of Leases which
leases were to "be in form satisfactory to defendants." The transaction was termake it inadvisable to go forward. The court held that the "discretion" was not in fact
absolute but had to be exercised in good faith. Richard Bruce & Co. v. J. Simpson & Co.,
40 Misc. 2d 501, 243 N.Y.S.2d 503 Sup. Ct. (1963).
31 In Continental Assurance Co. v. Van Cleve Bldg. & Constr. Co., 260 S.W.2d 319 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1953), the court rejected the argument that a loan commitment containing a "satisfaction" clause lacked mutuality.
32 168 Cal. App. 2d 336, 335 P.2d 690 (1959).
33 Id. at 339, 335 P.2d 692.
34 Thomas Haverty Co. v. Jones, 185 Cal. 285, 296, 197 P. 105, 110 (1921); Collins v.
Vickter Manor, Inc., 47 Cal. 2d 875, 882, 306 P.2d 783, 788 (1957); Tiffany v. Pacific
Sewer Pipe Co., 180 Cal. 700, 702-04, 182 P. 428, 429-30 (1919).
35 In Uhlman v. North Whittier Highlands, Inc., 167 Cal. App. 2d 758, 334 P.2d 1022,
(1959), decided by a different District Court of Appeals one month prior to Lyon v. Giannoni,
the Court applied the good faith test to a clause conditioning a broker's commission upon
his obtaining a major tenant for a proposed shopping center on terms and conditions satisfactory to the corporate landowner.
36 13 App. Div. 2d 106, 213 N.Y.S.2d 522 (1961), aff'd, 11 N.Y.2d 831, 182 N.E.2d
116, 227 N.Y.S.2d 944 (1962).
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minated after the plaintiff was unable to acquire satisfactory leases and the plaintiff sued for the return of its deposit. The trial court held that since the plaintiff
acted in "good faith" in its effort to get satisfactory leases, it was entitled to the
return of its deposit." The New York First Department reversed, holding that
the defendant was legally entitled to keep the deposit:
The requirement that the defendant must be satisfied with the "leases" did
not render the agreement illusory. It seems reasonable to believe that if
defendant had rejected the leases as unsatisfactory, it would have been required to do so on reasonable grounds resting on the form of the leases themselves, since it had accepted the tenants and the terms stated in the schedule.
But even if the test of defendant's rejection of the leases be good faith, rather
than reasonableness, the contract is enforceable according to its terms and is
not illusory.3
Since the New York Appellate Division was only called upon to decide the
validity of the contract, its decision regarding the standard must be considered
dictum; in any event it certainly lacks definitiveness."9

In Commercial Mortgage & Finance Corp. v. Greenwich Savings Bank,"0
the Supreme Court of Georgia was called upon to rule on the effect of a satisfac-

tion clause in a loan purchase commitment agreement. The plaintiff bank committed itself to purchase home mortgage loans of a specified aggregate amount
subject to plaintiff's approval of certain conditions.4 When the defendant refused
37 Id. at 109, 213 N.Y.S.2d 526.
38 Id.
39 "The New York Appellate Division held that the agreement was not illusory because
it was understood that such decisions would have to be reasonable or at least made in good
faith." Paley v. Barton Say. & Loan Ass'n, 82 N.J. Super. 75, 84, 196 A.2d 682, 686 (1964),
interpreting the Boston Road Shopping Center case. In Jay v. Wilson, supra note 13, the
court did not directly confront the issue as to whether a loan agreement which made the
lender's duty contingent upon title being satisfactory to his counsel was enforceable. The court
apparently bypassed this issue by presuming it was, and applied what seems to be a good
faith standard by stating that the lenders did not have the right "arbitrarily and capriciously
to refuse to be satisfied with the title which was tendered, but that there must be some reason
upon which the satisfaction is founded." 36 N.Y.S. at 187. In another old case, Fagen v.
Davidson, 2 Duer 153 (1853), the court rejected the middle ground of the good faith test
relating to a contract for the exchange of real property which provided that "the title to be
good and satisfactory to the party to receive the same." The court stated that to give the
agreement such a construction would be to rob it fully of its obligatory character, and held
that a title satisfactory to the party to whom it is given meant a title to which there is no
reasonable objection, and with which the party to whom it is tendered ought to be satisfied.
Ivor B. Clark, Inc. v. Boston Road Shopping Center, Inc., 24 Misc. 2d 84, 207 N.Y.S.2d 582
(Sup. Ct. 1960), takes a similar approach to a loan commitment agreement.
40 112 Ga. App. 388, 145 S.E.2d 249 (1965).
41 The agreement read, in part, as follows:
Terms and Conditions of Commitment for Purchase of FHA 203 Loans. 1. Plans
and specifications or any changes therein to be subject to the approval of The Greenwich Savings Bank and the Federal Housing Administration... 3. Sale of premises
to owner-occupants whose credit rating shall be satisfactory to the Federal Housing
Administration and The Greenwich Savings Bank. . . . 6. It is understood and
agreed that policies of title insurance in favor of The Greenwich Savings Bank and
written by title companies acceptable to us will be furnished dated as of the date
of the assignment of the mortgages to this institution. . . . 7. All documents to be
in form and contents satisfactory to our counsel. 8. All fire insurance policies together with extended coverage are to be in an amount and in companies acceptable
to us.
Similar conditions were provided for plaintiff's commitments with respect to purchase of VA
loans. Id. at 389, 145 S.E.2d 250.
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fully to perform the contract, plaintiff sued for liquidated damages. In dismissing
the defendant's argument that the contract was illusory, the court applied the
good faith standard without differentiating between the various conditions that
were subject to the plaintiffs satisfaction:
The contract here is not lacking in mutuality, for the plaintiff had a
positive obligation to purchase those loan agreements which were submitted
by defendant and were satisfactory to plaintiff in the stipulated respects in
the exercise of plaintiff's honest judgment. If plaintiff had refused to
purchase any loans submitted by defendant, defendant had the means of
enforcing the contract by seeking a jury determination
as to whether plaintiff
42
acted in good faith in rejecting the loans.
This decision represents a significant step forward in interpreting satisfaction clauses in loan commitments since it recognizes, at least implicitly, that it is
impossible to establish an objective standard where conditions relate to the
lender's satisfaction with the security. A number of conditions in a single commitment cannot be considered individually but rather must be taken as a whole
in determining whether the lender's security is sufficiently protected. Thus,
paraphrasing the test of Mattei,4 3 the multiplicity of factors involved in evaluating a lender's security indicates that this class of cases falls within the second
category of satisfaction clauses-those requiring merely good faith.
Such an analysis recognizes that modem real estate financing involves a
complex series of business judgments. The decision whether and upon what terms
to lend rests upon complicated formulas involving a series of interrelated questions. Frequently the terms of the loan, including the interest rate, will vary according to the degree of security the borrower can provide. The determination of
adequate security for a particular loan is highly subjective. Each lender will
evaluate differently the chances that it will be able to realize upon the security
if the borrower defaults on the loan. A multitude of factors and their interrelationship must be evaluated in determining whether the risk is one which the
lender is willing to take. This is especially true where interests in realty are involved, since these in fact, and in law, have always been deemed unique.
The good faith requirement thus appears to be more appropriate when
dealing with loan commitments since it is all but impossible to judge reasonable
satisfaction.44 What is required is that the lender use his business judgment in
42 Id. at 391-92, 145 S.E.2d 252.
43 51 Cal. 2d, 119, 330 P.2d 625 (1958).
44 Of course, it is also possible to come to the "good faith" standard through the "plain
meaning" rule of construction. In Anderson v. Franklin Soc. Federal Say. & Loan Assn., 39
Misc. 2d 7, 239 N.Y.S.2d 765 (Sup. Ct. 1963), the court, in interpreting a mortgage which
required that the mortgagor carry insurance with companies satisfactory to the mortgagee,
stated that the satisfaction clause meant exactly what it purported to say, and was therefore
enforceable:
The phrase "satisfactory to" has been interpreted "not as a stipulation for what
court or jury would pronounce satisfactory to a reasonable man, but literally as
meaning actually satisfactory to [the party] personally." [Citations omitted.] When
such literal construction is rejected, the reason is usually some consideration of
hardship or of unjust enrichment.
Id. at 10, 239 N.Y.S.2d 768.
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good faith" in determining whether the specific conditions" have been satisfactorily met so as to provide adequate security.
The good faith requirement applies not merely to the party which is to be

satisfied, usually the lender in the case of a commitment. The party which is to
satisfy, the borrower, also has a good faith obligation to meet the conditions of the

agreement. In Mezzanotte v. Freeland,"' the court, in interpreting a contract for
the sale of land which was contingent upon the purchaser obtaining satisfactory
financing, stated that the purchaser had an obligation to make a good faith
effort to seek proper financing.48 Accordingly, where a loan commitment, for

example, called for leases in form and substance satisfactory to the lender, the
borrower would have a duty to make a good faith effort to acquire such leases.
Mezzanotte and other cases49 have thus rejected the illusoriness argument based

in part upon the obligation of the one who must satisfy. The obligations of the
parties to a loan commitment are mutual, and the commitment agreement withstands the contentions of borrowers and lenders alike that it is illusory.
III. Vagueness and Indefiniteness
A second possible impediment to enforcing loan commitments is the argument that they are vague and indefinite. This view was accepted by the court in

Ivor B. Clark, Inc. v. Boston Road Shopping Center,5" an action by a broker
against a shopping center promoter for commissions allegedly earned in procuring
a lending institution's acceptance of a first mortgage loan application. The commitment agreement between the defendant and the institution was the same one
discussed in Boston Road Shopping Center, Inc. v. Teachers Insurance & Annuity Association of America5 ' which required the leases to "be in form satisfactory to the lender." In Ivor B. Clark,the New York Supreme Court held:
It is well known that loan instruments such as mortgages, bonds, notes,
etc., insurance policies and long term leases contain many complicated
He should fairly and candidly investigate and consider the matter, reach a genuine
conclusion, and express the true state of his mind. He cannot act arbitrarily or capriciously, or merely feign dissatisfaction.... It is of no consequence that a court
or jury might believe that he ought to have been satisfied, or that a reasonably
prudent purchaser would have been satisfied. Hollingsworth v. Colthurst, 78 Kan.
455, 456-57, 96 P. 851 (1908).
46 The dissatisfaction "must be not only bona fide and in good faith, but also must relate
to the specific subject matter of the condition. General dissatisfaction with the bargain will
not suffice." Western Hills, Oregon, Ltd. v. Pfau, 508 P.2d 201, 204 (Ore. 1973).
47 20 N.C. App. 11, 200 S.E.2d 410 (1973), cert. denied, 284 N.C. 616, 201 S.E.2d
689 (1974).
48 "The contract implies that plaintiffs would in good faith seek proper financing.
and that such financing in keeping with reasonable business standards could not be rejected
at the personal whim of plaintiffs but only for a satisfactory cause." Id. at 17, 200 S.E.2d
414. Note how the court skirts the good faith or reasonable man issue. The court continues:
"Where a contract confers on one party a discretionary power affecting the rights of the
other, this discretion must be exercised in a reasonable manner based upon good faith and
fair play." Id.
49 E.g., Kays v. Brack, 350 F. Supp. 1243 (D. Idaho 1972); Sheldon Simms Co. v.
Wilder, 108 Ga. App. 4, 131 S.E.2d 854 (1963). Cf. 3A A. Coa~Nn, CoNTRACTs § 767 (rev.
ed. 1963).
50 24 Misc. 2d 84, 207 N.Y.S.2d 582 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
51 13 App.Div. 2d 106, 213 N.Y.S.2d 522 (1961), aff'd, 11 N.Y.2d 831, 182 N.E.2d 116,
227 N.Y.S.2d 944 (1962).
45

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[April 1975]

provisions with respect to which there is often strenuous and protracted
negotiation, frequently followed by disagreement and no meeting of the
minds. Insofar as the last mentioned letters required defendant and the
lending institution to agree in the future as to the open, essential elements of
the transaction, they were too indefinite
to be enforced, and therefore did
52
not constitute a binding commitment.
This decision, however, cannot be reconciled with Teachers Insurancewhere
the court held the contract enforceable, although it did not directly consider
whether the provision was vague and indefinite. The holding in Teachers Insurance, while nominally based on the determination that the contract was not
illusory, impliedly rejects the vagueness argument. 5 Later cases have been more
explicit.
In Paley v. Barton Sauings & Loan Association,' after analyzing the commitment agreement, the court held:
[We do not find this agreement to be so vague as to require a determination
that it is unenforceable. The mere fact that certain items of an agreement
may require construction by a court does not establish that either of the
parties to that agreement is without any obligation thereunder. If it is at all
possible, a court will attach a sufficiently definite meaning to the terms of a
bargain to make it enforceable .. . and ambiguous words would be interpreted most strongly against the party who used them in cases of fair doubt
as to their scope ....
The significant consideration here is whether or not
the parties intended to enter into a binding agreement. It is manifest that
such an intention was present on the part of both parties.55
In Sonnenblick-Goldman Corp. u. George J. Murphy, " the plaintiff sought
recovery of the balance due on a commission for procuring an interim loan commitment for the defendant. The commitment provided that the amount of
reserves and holdbacks was within the lender's reasonable discretion. In affirming
the district court's directed verdict for the plaintiff, the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit reasoned:
Defendant argues that the contract [commitment] was too vague and indefinite to be enforceable, and was merely an "agreement to agree." We
disagree. The fact that some of the terms contained in the commitment...
were inherently flexible does not render the contract unenforceable. Where
the parties themselves have manifested an intent to make a contract and to
bind themselves to render future performance, the courts should not frustrate
52 24 Misc. 2d 89, 207 N.Y.S.2d 58-59.
53 Of course, the results reached in Lawrence Block, supra note 22, and Ivor B. Clark,
supra note 50, may hinge on the fact that both cases were suits by brokers to collect commissions. Cases involving brokers have often produced inconsistent applications of legal principles, since the courts frequently focus on the justice and equity of the broker collecting his
fee, and not on the substantive legal issue of whether an enforceable contract, which is a
precondition to the broker collecting his fee, was actually formed. Courts have generally been
reluctant to apply legal principles in a strict and neutral fashion where they feel technical
arguments are being used either to deprive a broker of his justly earned commission, or to
collect a brokerage commission where the parties have not actually come to an agreement.
54 82 NJ. Super. 75, 196 A.2d 682 (1964).
55 Id. at 82-83, 196 A.2d 686.
56 420 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir. 1970).
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this intention by holding that a gap in one of the terms of the otherwise

binding agreement renders the contract too vague and indefinite to enforce.57

The commentators are unanimous in their agreement with this rationale. As

stated by Professor Corbin:
If the parties have concluded a transaction in which it appears that they
intend to make a contract, the court should not frustrate their intention if
it is possible to reach a fair and just result, even though this requires a
choice among conflicting meanings and the filling of some gaps that the
parties have left.5

As with the closely related "illusory" defense, the courts have upheld the enforceability of satisfaction clauses in commitment agreements against the contention
that they are vague and indefinite.
IV. The Statute of Frauds
An agreement to make a loan requiring the execution and delivery of a
mortgage lien on real property must meet the requirements of the Statute of
Frauds. 9 Accordingly, the material elements of the mortgage loan and the acceptance must be clearly and unambiguously set forth in writing in the commitment letter;"0 this requirement would apply to the satisfaction provisions. Stated
in another way, the commitment must clearly indicate that the parties intend it
to be binding and not merely a step in the process toward an agreement on the
loan terms.61 The obligatory language' is important in this regard but certainly
would not be enough if too many gaps were left open for future determination.
In Bowery Savings Bank v. Retail Realty, Inc.," the plaintiff brought suit
57 Id. at 1173.

CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 95 at 400 (rev. ed. 1963). Accord, 1 S. WmMsToN, CoN§ 37 at 110-11 (1957).
59 Brizick v. Manners, 88 Eng. Rep. 454 (Ch. 1743) ; Driver v. Broad, 1 Q.B. 744 (1893).
In Sleeth v. Sampson, 237 N.Y. 69, 142 N.E. 355 (1923), Judge Cardozo stated:
One who promises to make another the owner of a lien or charge upon land, promises
to make "him the owner of an interest in land, and this is equivalent in effect to a
promise to sell him such an interest.
Id. at 72, 142 N.E. 356. C. BROWNS, STATUTE OF FRAuDs § 267 (1880); 5 H. TIFFANY, Tnz
LAw OF REAL PROPERTY § 1384 (B. Jones ed. 1939); Note, The Statute of Frauds and Oral
Agreements to Mortgage Land, 44 HAiv. L. Rnv. 269 (1931). The pertinent language of the
original Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. 2, c. 3, § 4 (1677) reads: "No action shall be brought...
upon any contract or sale of lands, tenements or heriditaments or any interest in or concerning

58

1 A.

TRACTS

them.

. . ."

For a modern example of this provision see N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 5-703

(McKinney 1964). See also RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 195 (1932), where "interest in
land" is defined for purposes of the Statute of Frauds as "any right, privilege, power or
immunity, or combination thereof, relating to realty which under the rules of law governing
that subject, (a) is property in realty, and (b) does not fall within the definition of goods
in § 200.
60 "To be sufficient, the required writing must be one 'which states with reasonable certainty... the terms and conditions of all the promises constituting the contract and by whom
and to whom the promises are made."' Ellis v. Klaff, 96 Cal. App. 2d 471, 476, 216 P.2d
15, 19 (1950).
61 Cf. Kris v. Pattison, 159 Minn. 213, 198 N.W. 541 (1924); 2 A. CoRm, CONTRACTS
§ 498 at 680 (1950).
62

See note 16 supra.

63

19 Misc. 2d 752, 191 N.Y.S.2d 904 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
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upon a surety completion bond in his favor when the proposed mortgagor refused
to go through with the loan on the ground that the commitment failed to satisfy
the Statute .ofFrauds. Defendant argued that the commitment was not a binding and enforceable contract because it was conditioned upon the execution of a
building loan agreement, the terms of which were left to future negotiation. The
trial court held for the defendant and noted that "since the terms of the building
loan agreement as to what amounts would be advanced at what stages of construction were of vital importance to said defendant and have never been agreed
upon, there was never a binding contract between it and plaintiff.""es However,
the intermediate appellate court unanimously reversed the decision, 6 holding that
"the payment schedule was not left open-but the parties agreed that it was to be
determined to the satisfaction of the bank."6" Motion for leave to appeal was
denied.6"
Although the Retail Realty case upholds a commitment agreement against a
Statute of Frauds attack,69 commitment agreement draftsmen should not minimize the Statute of Frauds problem when they use satisfaction clauses to leave as
many terms as possible open for determination in the future."
Nevertheless, where the written commitment evidences a clear intent on the
part of both lender and borrower to be bound and only conditions not presently
ascertainable are left for future determination, the purposes of the Statute of
Frauds would not be furthered by refusing to enforce the agreement. 1 In the
usual commitment, gaps are left not for future negotiation but rather for future
resolution by one of the parties who is under a duty to act in good faith."
64 Plaintiff relied upon Willmott v. Giarraputo, 5 N.Y.2d 250, 157 N.E.2d 282, 184
N.Y.S.2d 97 (1952), wherein Judge Fuld stated "Few principles are better settled in the law
of contract than the proposition that, 'If a material element of a contemplated contract is left
for future negotiations, there is no contract enforcible under the Statute of Frauds or otherwise." Id. at 253, 157 N.E.2d 283, 184 N.Y.S.2d 98.
65 19 Misc. 2d at 753, 191 N.Y.S.2d 905.
66 Bowery Savings Bank v. Retail Realty, Inc., 10 App. Div. 2d 924 (1960).
67 Id.
68 11 App. Div. 2d 649 (1960).
69 Cf. Biothermal Process Corp. v. Cohn & Co., 119 N.Y.S.2d 158, (Sup. Ct.) aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 283 App. Div. 60, 126 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1953), aff'd, 308 N.Y. 689, 124 N.E.2d
323 (1954), involving an underwriting commitment, which was held unenforceable because
of excessive "gaps."
70 In this regard, Sintenis, supra note 8, at 598 n.13 argues that a commitment would
be legally enforceable under the Statute of Frauds even though subject to the following conditions: (a) satisfactory completion of specific work items or the erections of a building; (b)
certificates of occupancy and electrical inspection and other needed municipal certificates of
compliance; (c) evidence of satisfaction of an existing personal loan; (d) good and marketable title to the subject premises; and (e) approval of leases of the subject premises.
71 Cardozo's statement in N.E.D. Holding Co. v. McKinley, 246 N.Y. 40, 157 N.E. 923
(1927) relating to a contract for the sale of realty in which certain terms were left blank, is
equally applicable to a future commitment:
We cannot say as an inference of law from the mere inspection of the writing that
anything of substance was left open to be agreed upon thereafter. The parties evidently thought they were bound, for they described the writing as a binder. [Citations
omitted.] We are not to strain for a construction that will defeat their expectation.
Details [not going to the substance of the transaction] may be left open for future
specification without destruction of the contract and of every remedy thereunder.
[Citations omitted.] Seller and buyer accept by implication as to such matters the
test of the reasonable or the customary if no other is available. It is all a question
of degree.
Id. at 44-45, 157 N.E. 924-25.
72 "[W]here the contract, instrument or agreement gives either party the unqualified
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V. Practical Considerations and Conclusions
The good faith requirement can arise in two distinct contexts in a legal
proceeding involving a future loan commitment. If the commitment is attacked
as illusory, vague and indefinite, or violative of the Statute of Frauds, the courts
have at least inferred an obligation to act in good faith to fill the gaps and render
the commitment enforceable. Neither party need prove good faith or the lack
of it. The mere requirement, implied by law, that the parties act in good faith
defeats these challenges to the commitment device. This must be distinguished
from the situation where one party to the commitment asserts that the other did
not act in good faith. Good faith thus becomes an issue of fact and the burdens
of proof must be assessed not only from a legal but also, as we shall see, from
a practical standpoint.
This distinction may be the basis for much of the confusion in the decisions" as to whether the good faith or reasonable man standard applies. Either
one sufficiently fills the gaps; where the validity of the commitment itself is under
attack, the courts need not choose between them. However, where one party
asserts that the other failed to meet a specific standard of conduct, the courts
must then articulate that standard. For reasons already indicated,' the good
faith standard is most suited to the future commitment device.
As a general rule, the burden of proof as to good faith rests upon the party
asserting a lack of good faith. In a loan commitment context, this burden may
fall upon either the borrower or the lender depending upon which party raises
the issue. If the borrower sues to enforce the commitment and asserts the lender's
lack of good faith in stating that the conditions were not satisfactorily met, he
would have the burden of proving satisfactory performance of the agreement.
He would have to show that all conditions precedent have been satisfied and,
consequently, that the lender acted in bad faith in rejecting his performance."
Additionally, for a promisee to recover for breach of contract, he must initially
prove himself ready, willing, and able to perform." This doctrine would apply
even if the lender has repudiated the contract:
An anticipatory breach, in a proper case, may excuse one from performing
a useless act, but it does not excuse one from the obligation of proving readiness, willingness, and ability to have performed the conditions precedent.77
On the other hand, if the lender sues to enforce the commitment or to recover damages relating to the borrower's breach, it must prove its readiness to go
right or power to make a selectional determination of the details without necessity of further
agreement or approval of other party," the requirement of the Statute of Frauds is met.
Skeeters v. Granger, 314 S.W. 2d 364, 367 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
73 Boston Rd. Shopping Center, Inc. v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of America, 13
App. Div. 2d 106, 213 N.Y.S.2d 522 (1961), aff'd, 11 N.Y.2d 831, 182 N.E.2d 116, 227
N.Y.S.2d 944 (1962); Mezzanotte v. Freeland, 20 N.C. App. 11, 200 S.E.2d 410 (1973),
cert. denied, 201 S.E.2d 689 (1974).
74 See text accompanying note 44 supra.
75 Sollows v. McCann Erickson, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 491, 492-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
76 Oltarsh v. Bratter, 48 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1931).
77 Ufitec v. Trade Bank and Trust Co., 21 App. Div. 2d 187, 190, 249 N.Y.S.2d 557,
560 (1964), aff'd, 16 N.Y.2d 698, 209 N.E.2d 551, 261 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1965).
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forward with the transaction and produce the funds. The lender would have
the burden of proving any assertion that the borrower did not act in good faith
in attempting to satisfy the conditions of the commitment. However, if the borrower answers by asserting the lender's lack of good faith in stating dissatisfaction,
the burden would then be placed upon the borrower with respect to this issue.
As a practical matter, however, a jury might disregard a proper charge
regarding the burden of proof if the party accused of bad faith has benefited
from a radical change in interest rates. In Regional Enterprises V.Teachers Insurance & Annuity Association,7 8 the Court .of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
upheld the trial court's judgment notwithstanding the verdict against the borrower claiming anticipatory repudiation based in large measure upon the fact
that the borrower obtained a loan elsewhere at a substantially lower interest rate.
The case, in effect, held that a jury may properly consider fluctuations in the interest rate in deliberating upon the enforceability of a loan commitment.
The Regional Enterprisescase is helpful to the practicing lawyer for another
reason. In Regional Enterprises,a shopping center developer had paid a deposit
of $40,000 upon entering into a loan commitment agreement. The commitment
agreement was made subject to the lender's approval of all tenant leases and, in
addition, to the developer obtaining, prior to the closing date of the loan, parking
rights on adjacent property. After some time had passed, these parking rights
had still not been obtained and the lender sent the developer a letter containing
a 19-page interoffice memorandum stressing the importance of the parking
rights. The letter invited the developer to remedy the situation and concluded
with the sentence: "After you have had an opportunity to consider the foregoing, please call the undersigned at any time.""9 The court held that this was
not an anticipatory repudiation of the agreement and that the lender was therefore entitled to retain the deposit as liquidated damages. Counsel for the lender
had been careful not to repudiate the commitment inadvertently based on the
developer's noncompliance with its terms. If it had not been so cautious, the
court implies that it might have lost its security deposit.
Lender's counsel was not so wise in Zelazny u. Pilgrim Funding Corp."0
The lender entered into a commitment agreement which was made subject to
"approval by our attorneys of all closing papers." Subsequently, the lender, taking note of rising interest rates and the danger of the borrower losing his job due
to a labor dispute, sent the borrower a letter stating in part:
On this commitment we indicated an interest rate of 5-/2%; however,

due to the fact that existing conditions to the Republic Aviation Corporation
may necessitate a possible layoff, we are obliged to change subject commitment to 5-4% interest rate.
Kindly indicate your acceptance by signing the enclosed copy.81
The court held that this attempt to change the interest rate constituted a repudiation of the commitment agreement and granted the borrower special dam78
79

352 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1965).
Id. at 771.

80

41 Misc. 2d 176, 244 N.Y.S.2d 810 (Dist. Ct. 1963).

81

Id. at 179, 244 N.Y.S.2d 814.
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ages."2 The borrower eventually lost his job and could not have gone through
with the loan anyway; the lender apparently lost because his repudiation was
premature.
Zelazny makes it clear that a lender who attempts to exercise good faith in
evaluating a borrower's fulfillment of the commitment agreement conditions
should be careful to not anticipatorily repudiate the agreement where it suspects
that the borrower will fail to satisfy the conditions. An invitation for discussion
suggests a better approach, especially where the lender is open to the criticism
that its actions were motivated by a favorable shift in interest rates. If one party
suspects that the other may be attempting to avoid the commitment, it could
request a reassurance of performance8 8 This would to some extent force the
other party to commit itself; silence could even be taken as implicit repudiation."
In order to establish good faith as to issues left to the lender's satisfaction,
counsel for each party should stand ready to prove the consistency of its client's
position on the particular matter at issue. For example, a lender fearing an
accusation of bad faith in rejecting a particular loan provision could show that
it has rejected similar provisions in the past; likewise, a borrower would benefit
if it could show the lender had previously accepted such provisions.
To recapitulate, in addition to facilitating interim construction financing,
an enforceable future commitment serves the legitimate economic function of
cushioning the impact of increasingly severe interest rate fluctuations upon the
construction and housing industries. In response to defenses of illusory promises,
vagueness, and the Statute of Frauds, the courts have expressly or impliedly
recognized the utility of future commitments by requiring lenders to act in good
faith in approving borrower compliance with commitment conditions and borrowers to act in good faith in meeting the conditions.

82 Plaintiff's damages included the increased rental, gas, and electric charges on a new
rental apartment, since he had terminated the lease on his old apartment in reliance upon
the commitment.
83 Cf. UNIFORM COMmERicAL CODE § 2-609 relating to the use of a request for reassurance
of performance with respect to the sale of goods. Although this provision technically would

not apply to contracts to lend money, a court could certainly find the reasoning behind it

applicable to the loan commitment area.
84 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL COVE § 2-609(4): "After receipt of a justified demand failure
to provide within a reasonable time not exceeding thirty days such assurance of due performance as is adequate under the circumstances of the particular case is a repudiation of
the contract."

